Since 1978 China has been transforming its centrally-planned socialist economy into a more mixed market system. China has also largely abandoned its nationalist technology strategy aimed at achieving self-reliance in favor of a more pragmatic strategy of importing advanced technologies and directing domestic R&D toward commercial purposes.
The strategy also worked well in expanding exports. China's exports of high-tech products in 1992 came to US$4 billion, 38.8 percent higher than the figure for 1991. Computers and communications equipment led the way, earning US$1.9 billion in foreign exchange.
However, China remained dependent on imported technology and components, and continues to have a trade deficit in high-tech products. Total high-tech imports came to US$10.7 billion, with computers and communications equipment constituting 35.7 percent of the total. 1 While China's official strategy is shifting from a nationalistic pursuit of self reliance to a more pragmatic mix of technology imports and export of lower-end products, actual policy changes have often been taken ad hoc. There is not yet a clearly defined vision of the future of IT in China. Nor is there is an institution in government with the authority and capability to develop and implement a comprehensive national IT plan, as authority is divided between agencies variously concerned with issues such as telecommunications, computers, information services, education and R&D. In part, this is due to Chinese political culture which resists allowing power to rest in a single institution or agency, but it is also a deliberate strategy to allow market forces to shape IT development rather than rely entirely on central planning.
IT INFRASTRUCTURE
The production and use of information technologies typically requires a supporting infrastructure including human resources, dependable telecommunications networks, research and development capabilities, and complementary industries such as consumer electronics and electronic components.
Human Resources
China's population as a whole is not especially well educated compared to developed or newly industrializing countries, and does not have high levels of scientists, engineers or programmers as a percent of its population. But China's population is so large that the absolute number of those professionals is very high. For instance, as of 1990, China had about 1,170,000 programmers, well behind the U.S. (2,006,000), but ahead of India (917,000) and Japan (977,000) (Table 1) . So IT producers and users have access to a large pool of skilled professionals who work for much lower wages than their counterparts in more developed countries. These professionals may not be as productive as their counterparts in the U.S. or Japan, but that is mainly due to lack of tools, which can be bought, and experience, which can be developed over time.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Telecommunications Networks
Basic telephone service is currently provided to about 2% of China's 1.2 billion population, although urban areas have a penetration rate closer to 20%. There were over 600,000 cellular telephone subscribers at the end of 1993, and subscribership is projected to hit 2 million with service in 400 cities by the end of 1995. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which is responsible for the telecommunications infrastructure, is unable to keep up with the overwhelming demand for basic phone services, not to mention the demand for new services (data, messaging, mobile) from government, business and academia. For example, there were only 200,000 fax machines, six electronic mail systems each having 3,000 mailboxes with a capacity of 100,000 bytes, one voice mail system having 50,000 mailboxes, and no on-line data services in China in 1992. 2 MPT wants to triple the 32 million telephone lines in the country to about 93 million by the year 2000, achieving a 7% overall and 40% urban penetration (Figure 1 ). This means that MPT wants to do in 15 years what took 40 years in Japan and 80 years in the U.S. MPT's strategy is to build a single, unified network to provide basic telephone services under its monopoly, while allowing competition for non-basic services. The rationale is that a unified network is needed and that only a monopoly provider can raise sufficient revenues to provide universal service. 3 [Insert Figure 1 here]
MPT said in 1994 it would invest $41.4 billion, including $7 billion in foreign capital, over the next six years in its massive program to triple the number of switched lines. 4 This is equivalent to creating one Baby Bell a year for seven years, and would still leave China with a telephone penetration level of just 7% for the whole population (Figure 1 China's industrial development zones. 5 The rapidly growing coastal regions will probably develop advanced telecommunications services before most of the country has any service at all.
Research and Development
China's R&D spending was 0.72% of its GNP in 1991. This compares to 2.77% for Japan, 1.91% for Korea, 1.70% for Taiwan and 0.91% for India. About half of China's R&D is financed by government agencies and half by enterprises (including state enterprises). In the past, R&D was concentrated on defense technologies or on basic research, with little effort made to develop commercial technologies. This trend is starting to change as the economy becomes more market-oriented and government science and technology policies focus more on the needs of industry.
Complementary Industries
China has a large electronics industry, with production of US$17.6 billion in 1993 6 ( Figure 2 ), but the industry is technologically backward and consists mostly of consumer electronics (TVs, VCRs) with little industrial electronics production (semiconductors, components). China's domestic electronics industry suffered a serious competitive blow with the decentralization of the electronics industry in the early-1980s. The result was that each province set up its own factories to produce components. The number of factories increased from 2,688 in 1982 to 3,299 in 1992, with an average employment of 500 workers. Thus, there are numerous factories; they often produce the same products; and few are achieving the economies of scale necessary to move down the learning curve and bring manufacturing costs down and quality up.
The industry is also plagued by aging equipment, low labor productivity and shortages of parts good buys on used equipment. 7 China's semiconductor production will consist mostly of simple assembly and testing operations until it is able to develop the technical capabilities to handle more advanced processes such as wafer fabrication.
In summary, China's IT infrastructure is poor but improving. Its greatest asset is the large number of computer programmers, which provide low cost, skilled professionals for both IT producers and users. Its big plans to expand telephone services between and within the large urban centers may turn out to be somewhat unrealistic, but will still result in a leap forward in telecommunications. China's R&D is becoming more applied and commercially oriented though the level of spending is still low. The weakest element in China's IT infrastructure is probably the electronics industry, which normally is complementary to the computer industry, providing components and skilled workers for the industry. However, China's electronics enterprises are technologically backward and unable to meet the demand of their own markets, let alone transfer many resources to the IT industry.
TECHNOLOGY POLICY
China has targeted science and technology research institutes as keys to economic competitiveness. In the past, research institutes developed products that often had no relation to market needs. To encourage researchers to respond to the needs of industry, the government has cut the budgets of state-sponsored research institutes, forcing them to turn to industry for China to make commitments to local sourcing, training and technology transfer.
Information Technology Policy
From 1981-1985 the government's objective was to build a domestic computer industry and avoid technological dependency on the West. It sought foreign investment and technology with which to develop its own mass-production facilities. Foreign vendors were not interested in such investments, but some, such as IBM, were successful in exporting computers to China.
By 1986, the government began to encourage joint-ventures where foreign vendors would bring technology and manufacturing skills and local companies would provide inexpensive labor and access to the domestic market. The government still sought to build a broad-ranging computer industry from mainframes to PCs to components, but had little success in developing higher-end products. By 1991, China abandoned its goal of self-reliance, decided to import highend computers such as mainframes and minicomputers, and oriented its strategy for the domestic computer industry around microcomputers, workstations, software and peripherals. By exporting these products, MEI hopes to earn foreign exchange to import expensive higher-end systems and the technology needed to sustain and upgrade its domestic IT production.
China's electronics industry, including computers, was given priority status by the government in March 1993. This status provides the industry with preferential treatment, increased government investment and exemption from periodic austerity measures to the year 2000. Primary responsibility for the computer industry was given to the MEI, and specifically to its Computer Department. MEI also has a Telecommunications Department which is concerned with setting policy to link the government's many private data networks.
China's strategy for the computer sector, which is mostly being developed and implemented by MEI, consists of five elements:
Promote computer use throughout the economy.
Although MEI's objective is to promote the computer industry in particular, the industry's development is seen more broadly as a means of expediting national economic development. The government has also lowered trade barriers to encourage IT diffusion. Import duties were reduced from 82% in 1992 to 35% in 1993, and are expected to be reduced to 15% in the future. There are several reasons for the change. First, industry protection through import duties results in higher prices for computers and therefore conflicts with the broader goal of promoting IT use. Second, the current policy is being systematically undermined by outright smuggling and by "double screwdriver operations". Duties and taxes are more than 35% for a completely assembled computer. However, the tax on components is only 17%. As a result, some companies in Hong Kong buy completely assembled computers from abroad, take them apart, and bring them into China at the 17% rate. They then reassemble them in China, thus avoiding the higher tariff rate. These computers, plus those smuggled in, are estimated to be around 50% of the official number of PCs installed annually. The third reason for change is that China expects to become a member of the GATT(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)/World
Trade Organization in the near future and will be required to reduce its import duties to around 15%.
These changes will put China's domestic computer companies under severe competition.
The computer industry wants protection for a longer period of time, but MEI feels that it cannot impede application of the technology to other industries just to support the computer industry.
MEI has stated that after 1995, government subsidies to domestic computer companies will be discontinued and they will have to compete on their own merits or go out of business. It is unlikely that this will actually occur because there are many jobs involved and China has not shown yet that it is ready to accept the downside of the market system, i.e., bankruptcies and unemployment. However, some consolidation and reorganization of the industry is possible.
Separate the management of enterprises from the government functions of policymaking and regulation.
MEI's Computer Department has been reorganized, separating its regulatory and production functions. It is supposed to serve mainly as a policy/regulatory body for the industry instead of sending down detailed plans and production quotas to the state-run enterprises under its control. However, it is unclear how this new enterprise management will work out. The
Ministry still prepares socialist type production quotas and five year plans for the enterprises. In addition, many of its senior staff are both high ranking officials in the ministry and members of company boards or senior managers. MEI owns 216 computer factories, 36 of which are PC
facilities. Approximately five of these state-owned enterprises produced 82% of China's total domestic computer output in 1992. The others produce components, peripherals or small quantities of PCs.
Encourage alliances with foreign vendors.
China lacks the production capacity to meet its own needs for computers, and also lacks the technology to produce advanced products. So MEI encourages joint ventures in which foreign companies are given access to the local market in exchange for transferring technology to their Chinese partner. It is promoting joint ventures more frequently than in the past, and on more favorable terms to the foreign partner. MEI is also requiring technology transfer from foreign companies as the price of admission into the fast growing Chinese IT market. That market, in addition to China's pool of computer professionals and abundance of cheap unskilled labor, is a powerful attraction to companies which control needed technologies. In addition to technology transfer, China is requiring multinationals to export around half of their production to try to improve China's trade balance in IT.
Promote Technology Parks
Foreign production, start-up enterprises, and technology transfer are being promoted or Shanghai, which is considered to be China's leading commercial center. The government's plans appear to be based on political considerations, primarily the desire to keep the provinces happy and spread some of the benefits of economic growth around the country.
Provide Datacommunications Networks
Because MPT has not been able to provide the high capacity data networks needed by However, speculation is that Unicom will become a major competitor to DGT in telephone service.
POLICY OUTCOMES: IT USE AND PRODUCTION

IT Use in China
The hardware market. Computer use in China was hampered in the past by its own policy of self-reliance and by Western restrictions on the sale of computers to China. In 1980, China began to import foreign computers and software products for use in business, banking, and State information gathering. By the end of 1983, the total installed base was 4,545 mainframes, minicomputers and workstations and about 30,000 PCs. Overall growth in computer use has continued steadily ever since (Figures 3 and 4) .
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 The software and services market. Compared to hardware, the software and services market is small, comprising only one-fourth of the total market, but growing at more than 20% a year ( Figure 6 ). The PC software market was estimated at US$108 million for 1991, with US$49 million Hanzified, US$31 million domestic, US$23 million American and US$6 million other foreign software. Hanzified software, which is the bulk of the installed PC software, refers to software that has been modified to accept Chinese character input. It usually is modified without the permission of the original developers, full of bugs and one-to-two versions behind the U.S.
releases. The most popular application programs are Chinese character input and word processing systems, followed by spreadsheet and database management systems.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Comparison with other markets. The Chinese computer market is still tiny relative to the size of the country's population and its economy. Relative to its population and GDP, China's level of installed computing capacity falls far behind the newly industrialized countries (NICs), and is even slightly behind the other developing countries in the region (Table 2) . At its present growth rate, it will take decades for China to catch up with its neighbors as a user of IT.
However, these figures can be misleading. Most IT investment is going into commercial organizations (public and private) in urban areas, and will continue to do so for the next decade.
The level of IT use is undoubtedly much higher in the modernizing sectors of the Chinese economy and among educated urban elites. The people and institutions that are leading China's advance into the international economy are rapidly adopting IT as a tool. The spread of IT throughout the country will most likely follow the patterns of economic growth and expansion of the telecommunications network.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In the past, export of computers to China from the West were restricted by the
Coordinating Committee for Exports to Communist Countries (COCOM). COCOM was
abolished in 1994, but technology exports to China from the U.S. are still subject to restriction by the U.S. government. Exporters have to get permission for any shipments of products on the restricted list, which includes computer equipment. These restrictions have been eased, allowing computers based on powerful chips such as Intel's Pentium (but not DEC's Alpha) to be sold in China.
IT Production in China
Hardware production. The computer industry in China is small, but growing rapidly.
There are no general purpose mainframe manufacturers. There is one minicomputer joint venture with DEC making PDP-11s and VAXs. The remainder of China's computer makers are PC and PC-component manufacturers.
Reliable data on domestic computer production are difficult to obtain. Available figures place domestic production of all types of computer equipment in 1992 between US$1.2 billion 9 and US$2 billion 10 . Figure 7 shows computer hardware production from 1983-1991 according to The value of custom programming is undoubtedly larger, but is difficult to ascertain as most programming in large organizations is done by in-house staff and boutique software houses.
Multinational IT companies are beginning to look at China as a low-cost site for software development. IBM China/Hong Kong has teamed up with the Bank of East Asia and the Shenzen University Software Development Corp. to develop software products for IBM in both
Chinese and English for worldwide distribution.
The Chinese PC industry and market are based on a Chinese version of the MS-DOS operating system, but it is reportedly difficult to find a Chinese company that is selling licensed operating system software. There are some UNIX, OS/2 and Macintosh users too, but they are a small minority. Microsoft waited until intellectual property laws were passed to enter the China market directly, but MEI was unhappy when Microsoft developed its Chinese version of Windows in Taiwan and Japan. MEI was also upset that Microsoft was taking the lead in developing standards for Chinese character fonts, rather than working with MEI to set nonproprietary standards. Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates visited China in 1994 to try to smooth over the problems, offering technology transfer and even speaking out in favor of renewal of China's most-favored nation status. Still, there is strong concern among government officials that China will become dependent on a software standard controlled by a U.S. company.
The ability of the Chinese to develop a software industry is limited mainly by the lack of a vigorous domestic software market. There is no real software market in China because software is copied freely even by government agencies and enterprises. China has very good software engineers and has developed many local software products, but no matter how good they are, it has been virtually impossible to distribute them profitably because domestic software is subject to the same indiscriminate copying as imported software. Until software protection laws are really enforced in China, it will be difficult to develop the domestic software industry.
CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES
China's IT strategy has shifted from developing indigenous technological capabilities and producing a full range of computers to promoting IT use and producing PCs and components.
Tariffs have been lowered to encourage use. Massive investments are planned to expand and upgrade the telecommunications network. To promote production, the government has set up software parks, encouraged joint ventures with foreign IT firms, and put state computer enterprises on more of a commercial footing.
China's policies have shown signs of success, as computer use and production have grown dramatically in recent years. The key to the success of China's technology policy seems to be rooted in pragmatism. Policymakers appear willing to change and adapt when existing policies are not achieving their goals or when new opportunities appear. This type of flexibility is critical to responding to the rapid changes in technology and international markets.
If the trend towards increased market orientation and pragmatism continues through the transition to the post-Deng Xiaoping era, IT use and production should continue to grow rapidly.
An improved information infrastructure and increased IT use can in turn benefit the economy as a whole by improving productivity throughout the economy and by making timely market information available to producers and consumers in the huge Chinese economy. In the process of realizing the potential benefits of IT, however, a number of issues must be faced by the Chinese government.
Continuing reform of the Chinese economy
Rapid assimilation of IT and development of the IT industry requires a stable investment environment and further deregulation of the economy. Human and financial resources are available in China, but it is important that they be deployed effectively. This requires freeing up the labor and capital markets to better allocate resources. Wages need to be based on skill and productivity, and scarce capital needs to be invested in productive activities. Market incentives are necessary to encourage application of IT to increase productivity. A company with no real profit motive has no reason to invest in new technologies. The government will no doubt continue to play a major role in guiding the economy, much as other East Asian governments have done, but it needs to reduce its role as owner and producer. It also needs to develop a clear legal foundation of contracts and intellectual property protection, and enforce its own laws.
Information versus IT
The government is still trying to come to grips with how to deal with the information services sector, as it involves access to the many computer databases of the State Information
Center and government ministries. The government has 20% of the information agencies in the country, but these control 80% of the available information or databases. The government's desire to maintain control over information can conflict with the objective of developing an information services industry. Services such as on-line databases are valuable tools for government and industry, but allowing more people (including those in other ministries) to have increased access to data could be threatening to various power elites in government.
Policy coordination
A major challenge facing China in developing and implementing IT policy will be the difficult to achieve, at best. However, without some mechanism for coordinating policy, it will be impossible to implement a coherent strategy for IT, and China could continue to be beset by inefficient producers, duplication of R&D efforts, and the spread of incompatible technical standards among different regions and institutions.
The creation of ad hoc committees by the State Council is evidence that China's political leaders intend to try to force cooperation between the ministries. If this fails, one agency, such as MEI, might use alliances with other agencies and revenues from its associated enterprises to implement its own vision of IT policy. However, it is unlikely that MPT, the PLA or the provinces can be pushed aside easily. It is quite possible that IT policy in China will continue to be fragmented and uncoordinated for many years to come.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR FOREIGN COMPANIES
The huge potential of the Chinese market makes it impossible for Western firms to ignore, even if they don't expect to make a profit there for years. The China market provides opportunities to maintain economies of scale in production, to amortize R&D investments and to establish technology standards in a major market. 4 From a simply defensive point of view, no multinational firm can afford to be cut out of China and allow its competitors to dominate such a large market.
The large size of China's market does not mean that it is easy for foreign firms to make any money. Having superior technology or price-performance is not enough to win contracts.
The government expects suppliers to provide financing, move production to China and transfer 
